Climate Adaptation Week: Showcasing the diversity of climate adaptation
News publ. 10. Sep 2024
Comment by Dennis Tänzler
It is becoming almost a rule that European elections are accompanied by significant crises and upheavals. In 2009, it was the financial crisis, followed by the migration crisis, and most recently the climate crisis. The upcoming elections are heavily influenced by the shift to the right in many EU member states – a democracy crisis that is assuming ever broader proportions. In the face of populist rejection, and even denial of climate change by the right-wing parties, on June 9th, the guiding principle of the current EU Commission – the implementation of the Green Deal – will also be under scrutiny.
The Commission's climate policy record is marked by a series of comprehensive changes that have been initiated despite strong resistance: expansion of emissions trading, requirements for companies to avoid greenwashing, and systematic integration of climate policy into relations with key partner countries. For many climate activists, these changes are still far from sufficient, while many in the EPP find the Green Deal too ecologically focused.
The problem is that we are at best speaking of a halftime assessment of the Green Deal. Too many initiatives are still in their infancy or await implementation. And through the elections and the expected political shifts towards the right, much is at risk of remaining unfinished.
But who will lead European climate policy into a successful second half? The obvious candidate here would be Germany. Despite frequent blockages in domestic policy discussions, it can, and must, take on leadership in foreign policy. It demonstrated its ability to conduct climate diplomacy with its significant contribution to the agreement on a financial mechanism for losses and damages of the most vulnerable countries last year during COP28 in Dubai.
The corresponding repertoire for forming climate policy alliances is much broader. Germany could become even stronger as a leading force here. This is evidenced by the climate foreign policy strategy developed across ministerial boundaries, also presented at the end of last year on the sidelines of climate negotiations. A key component of this strategy lies in establishing comprehensive partnerships with individual countries to achieve ambitious emissions reductions and facilitate a just transition. These partnerships complement the multilateral negotiation process and ideally should fundamentally transform the decarbonization efforts of significant emitters.
While these arrangements have started – they are also conducted under the name JET-P, Just Energy Transition Partnership, with countries such as South Africa or Indonesia – their spectrum of cooperative approaches is much broader, as the German government's strategy concept indicates. The status of individual partnerships is currently being evaluated by the federal government. This presents a good opportunity to communicate clear guidelines and advance them in Brussels – even amidst foreseeable political changes in Brussels.
While the Commission President has advanced bilateral diplomacy for implementing partnerships in climate and energy issues, evidently, an expanded game plan is needed to consistently align these efforts with the Paris Climate Agreement goals, especially the phase-out from fossil fuels. Simultaneously, new arrangements – such as for the development and trade of hydrogen – must also adhere to fair and sustainable criteria. If successful, they promise to yield a peace dividend by enhancing regional stability.
Ultimately, partnerships can also help target and transparently provide the necessary climate finance. Like in Germany, the Brussels budget will face challenges in its climate policy ambitions post-election due to new configurations. Aligning bilateral cooperation with understandable climate policy requirements offers strong arguments – both in Brussels against right-wing and populist criticism, and internationally. Discussions on a new long-term climate finance target will significantly shape climate negotiations in the coming years.
Given this state of play, it is clear: Germany must take a clear stance within the EU and strengthen Europe to expand Green Deal Diplomacy. This requires actively promoting coherence in cooperation with individual strategic partner countries and actively demonstrating the added value of investments in these partnerships in political discussions. This demands perseverance: tackling the climate crisis will hardly be achievable in just one more half-time.
This opinion piece first appeared in the Frankfurter Rundschau on 6 June 2024.